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Democratic public good provision
Abstract
This paper analyzes an overlapping generation model of redistribution and public good provision under
repeated voting. Expenditures are financed through age-dependent taxation that distorts human capital
investment. Taxes redistribute income both across skill groups and across generations. We focus on
politico-economic Markov equilibria and contrast these with the Ramsey allocation under commitment.
The model features indeterminate equilibria, with a key role of forward-looking strategic voting. Due to
the lack of commitment to future policies, the tax burden may be on the wrong side of the dynamic
Laffer curve. Moreover, restrictions on government policies can in some cases be welfare improving.
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Abstract
This paper analyzes an overlapping generation model of public good provision under
repeated voting. The public good is Þnanced through age-dependent taxation that
distorts human capital investment. Taxes redistribute income both across diﬀerent skill
groups and across generations. We contrast the political equilibria with the Ramsey
allocation, and analyze the sources of ineﬃciency. The political equilibria can feature
both under- and over-provision of public good, as well an ineﬃcient life-cycle proÞle of
taxes.
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1 Introduction
This paper analyzes the dynamics of public good provision when this is determined in
repeated elections. We consider an environment where  like in many real world applications
 public goods beneÞt all agents equally, but the burden of Þnancing is unevenly distributed.
Hence, there are conßicts of interests about provision of public goods. In particular, we
compare the political provision of the public good with the Ramsey second-best allocation,
focusing on (i) the amount of public good provision and (ii) the distribution of the tax
burden across age groups.
The distinctive feature of our theory is the presence of non-trivial dynamic interactions
between economics and politics. In particular, (i) policies are decided through period-by-
period voting and (ii) they aﬀect investment decisions. These two elements make political
decisions substantially richer than in static models, since the current political choice aﬀects
future income distribution and future voting outcomes, via private investment decisions.
Thus, while some policies tend to regenerate their constituency over time, others carry the
seed of their destruction. This, in turn, opens a scope for strategic voting, i.e., agents may
use their current political choice to inßuence the future constituency of the policy.
The model economy is populated by overlapping generations of agents endowed with
quasi-linear preferences over a private good, a pure public good and eﬀort. Each period,
agents vote on two separate income tax rates, for old and young agents, respectively, and
the proceeds are used to Þnance the current provision of the public good. When young,
agents make a human capital investment increasing their expected earnings. The initial
investment and the subsequent realization of luck make agents more heterogenous as they
age and hence, lock-in their preferences over taxation. Thus, taxation distorts human
capital investment and has persistent eﬀects on the distributions of earnings which, in turn,
determines the political demand for taxation. It is the ability to use current policy to
manipulate future distributions and future policies that introduces a motive for strategic
voting.1
We start by characterizing constrained-eﬃcient allocations. In particular, we solve for
the Ramsey allocations whereby a utilitarian planner sets an inÞnite tax sequence, with
full commitment, under the constraint of running a balanced budget. The planners public
good provision is aﬀected both by its intrinsic value and by her desire to redistribute income
between generations. The latter objective depends on the extent to which the planner
1Note that our use of the term strategic voting parallels that of the strategic debt-literature (see
Persson and Tabellini, 2000) where governments use public debt in order to constrain the policies of future
governments.
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discounts future generations utilities: if her discount rate is higher (lower) than that of
private agents, she will let the young (old) carry the brunt of the tax burden.
Next, we move to the positive analysis, and characterize the set of Markov political
equilibria under majority voting. We show that there exist multiple equilibria  one sin-
cere equilibrium with high taxes and a range of strategic equilibria with low taxes. In
the former, agents (optimally) do not use current policy to strategically manipulate future
policies. In the latter, voters (again, optimally) restrain taxation on the young in order to
induce a future majority that will not tax the old, thereby strengthening the incentives for
the young to invest and thus enlarge the current tax base for the public good.
Generally, equilibria do not lie in the (second-best) Pareto frontier. A Þrst reason for
this is that in political equilibria, taxation is only driven by the desire to redistribute, so
that the equilibrium allocations do not depend on the value of the public good, which is
the case in the Ramsey allocation. Thus, when the value of the public good is suﬃciently
low, the political equilibria over-provide public goods, relative to any Ramsey-allocation.
Conversely, if this value is suﬃciently high, political equilibria under-provide public goods.
A second, more subtle, reason is that the political system does not allow agents to commit to
future taxation, which leads to an ineﬃcient distribution of the burden of taxation between
the young and the old.
In a related paper, Hassler, Rodríguez-Mora, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2003), hence-
forth HRSZ, show that the process of democracy over time can lead to the perpetual
survival of an ineﬃcient transfer system, i.e., a system that no agent, at birth, would
like to have in place, but that a majority imposes over the minority, once the uncertainty
over lifetime earnings has been revealed. The current paper diﬀers from HRSZ in several
important respects.
First, the only government policy considered in HRSZ is transfers between groups.
In the data, transfers constitute only a limited share of public redistribution. The lion
share of government expenditures is allocated to activities with important public good
components, such as education, defence, infrastructure, etc. Since agents are risk-neutral, in
ex-ante terms, government policy is entirely wasteful in HRSZ, which precludes interesting
normative analysis. The focal point of the current paper is precisely the normative aspects
of political equilibria.
Second, in HRSZ, the Þscal tools for inter-generational redistribution are limited since
polices are restricted to be age-independent. In reality, many government programs such as
health care, schooling, etc., are targeted at speciÞc age groups, and taxation also has im-
portant age-dependent elements. Allowing for age-dependent taxes has major implications
for the dynamics. In particular, in HRSZ, the initial distribution of agents has permanent
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political eﬀects; for instance, a welfare state can never arise if there is an initial majority of
net contributors to the system. In contrast, in the current paper, the identity of the initial
median voter only determines the initial taxation of the old, which has no eﬀect on the
future distribution of voters. As a result, the analytical characterization is simpler than in
HRSZ, which is of independent methodological interest.
Third, in HRSZ, all agents are born identical, and the conßict of interests only arises
ex-post, i.e., after the realization of stochastic returns to human capital investment. This
implies, unrealistically, that all young agents expect to lose from redistribution. In this
paper, however, we introduce ex-ante heterogeneity in ability, which allows us to address
policy-relevant issues such as the fate of poor agents in diﬀerent equilibria and under dif-
ferent political set-ups.
Finally, this paper generalizes the political mechanism in HRSZ by considering (i) prob-
abilistic voting together with majority voting, and (ii) a diﬀerent timing of the voting game,
such that the young exert political inßuence.
We study a framework where the political demand for redistribution is driving the
equilibrium provision of public goods. The argument that redistribution can be a motive
for public good provision dates back to Wilson (1991) and Mirrlees (1994). They show
that if agents are heterogenous and lump-sum taxes are available, then it can be optimal to
over-provide public goods, relative to a Samuelson-Lindahl benchmark, in order to achieve
redistribution.
There are examples of papers examining dynamic aspects of politically-driven public-
good provision, such as the strategic use of debt-literature (Persson and Svensson, 1989,
and Alesina and Tabellini, 1990). There, politicians have preferences over the type of public
good provided or the amount of public good provision, which diﬀer from the preferences of
future policy makers, and they use debt and current provision of public goods strategically
in order to manipulate the future provision of public goods.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and Section 3 character-
izes the Ramsey-optimal allocations. Section 4 presents the political equilibrium concept,
and Section 5 analyzes political equilibria under majority voting. In Section 6, we extend
the voting set-up to allow young voters to have larger inßuence on political outcomes and
we also consider a qualitatively diﬀerent voting mechanism, probabilistic voting. Section 7
concludes. Proofs are provided in the Appendix.
3
2 The model
The model economy consists of a continuum of two-period lived agents. Each generation has
a unit mass. Agents are, at birth, of two types: high-ability and low-ability, in proportion
µ and 1 − µ, respectively. High-ability agents can aﬀect their prospects in life by an
initial (educational) eﬀort choice. In particular, they either become rich or poor, and the
costly investment increases their probability of becoming rich, denoted by e. The cost of
investment is quadratic and equal to e2. Rich agents earn a high wage, normalized to unity,
in both periods, whereas poor agents earn a low wage, normalized to zero. Low-ability
agents make no investment choice; irrespective of their private actions, they are deemed to
poverty.
There is a government whose role it is to provide a public good, g, Þnanced by income
taxes levied on the rich. The tax rates are allowed to be age-dependent, τO for the old
and τY for the young, but restricted to lie between zero and 100%. Since only the rich
pay taxes, public good provision is redistributive. The tax rates are determined before
the young agents decide on their investment and the government budget balances in every
period.
The expected utility of agents alive at time t is given as follows:
V os
¡
gt, τ
O
t
¢
= 1− τOt + agt
V ou
¡
gt, τ
O
t
¢
= V ol
¡
gt, τ
O
t
¢
= agt
V y
¡
et, gt, gt+1, τ
Y
t , τ
O
t+1
¢
= et
¡
1− τYt + β
¡
1− τOt+1
¢¢
+ a (gt + βgt+1)− e2t
V yl (gt, gt+1) = a (gt + βgt+1) ,
where V os, V ouand V y denote the utility of old rich, old poor and high-ability young,
respectively, whereas V ol and V yl denote the utility of the old and young low-ability agents.
Note that V y is computed prior to individual success or failure. β ∈ [0, 1] is the discount
factor and a is the marginal utility of the public good. The assumption that this marginal
utility is constant is made for tractability. It is straightforward to show that the solution
to the optimal investment problem of the young, given τYt and τ
O
t+1, is
e∗
¡
τYt , τ
O
t+1
¢
=
¡
1 + β − ¡τYt + βτOt+1¢¢ /2.
Since high-ability agents are ex-ante identical, agents of the same cohort choose the
same investment, implying that the proportion of old poor in period t+ 1 is given by
ut+1 = 1− e∗
¡
τYt , τ
O
t+1
¢
=
¡
1− β + τYt + βτOt+1
¢
/2. (1)
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Thus, the proportion of old poor at t + 1 depends on the tax rate on the young at t, and
the tax rate of the old at t+1. The price of the public good is normalized to one, implying
that the balanced government budget can be expressed as
gt = µ (1− ut) τOt + µe∗
¡
τYt , τ
O
t+1
¢
τYt . (2)
3 Eﬃcient allocations
In this section, we characterize the Ramsey allocation. This is deÞned as the sequences of
taxes,
©
τYt , τ
O
t
ª∞
t=0
, chosen by a benevolent social planner who solves
max
{τYt ,τOt }∞t=0
n
βµ (1− u0) V os
¡
g0, τ
O
0
¢
+ β (µu0 + 1− µ) V ou
¡
g0, τ
O
0
¢
+ (3)
∞X
t=0
λt
³
V y
¡
et, gt, gt+1, τ
Y
t , τ
O
t+1
¢
+ (1− µ) V yl (gt, gt+1)
´)
,
subject to the implementability constraints, (1) and (2), and τOt , τ
Y
t ∈ [0, 1] ∀t. Note that
the planner discounts the future generations utilities with a discount factor λ ∈ [0, 1).
Furthermore, the utility of the initial generation of old agents is weighted by the rate β.
This implies that a planner who sets λ = β attaches the same weight to the felicity of the
young born at t and that of the old born at t− 1. If λ < β (λ > β), the planner attaches a
smaller (larger) weight to the former than to the latter.
The objective function of the planner, (3), can be rewritten as follows;
L (u0) = max{τYt ∈[0,1],τOt ∈[0,1]}∞t=0
©
βµ (1− u0)
¡
1− τO0
¢
+ (β + λ) aµ (1− u0) τO0 (4)
+
∞X
t=0
λt
³
λµ
³
e∗
¡
τYt , τ
O
t+1
¢ ¡
1− τYt + β
¡
1− τOt+1
¢¢− ¡e∗ ¡τYt , τOt+1¢¢2´
+(β + λ) aµe∗
¡
τYt , τ
O
t+1
¢
τYt + λ (β + λ) aµe
∗ ¡τYt , τOt+1¢ τOt+1¢ ,
where e∗ is given by (1), and the terms µe∗
¡
τYt , τ
O
t+1
¢
τYt and µe
∗ ¡τYt , τOt+1¢ τOt denote the
amount of public good Þnanced by the young and by the old at t, respectively. Note that
the objective function is proportional to the parameter µ, which implies that the Ramsey
taxes will be invariant to this parameter. The reason is that public good provision gt is
proportional to µ, since only the rich are taxed (see equation (2)).
The formulation in (4) emphasizes that the Ramsey problem, while non-recursive in
nature, admits a recursive representation whereby the planner commits to a tax sequence
τYt and τ
O
t+1 in each period t. In addition, the planner solves a diﬀerent problem in the
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Þrst period, when he can choose τO0 after the old have already made their eﬀort choice, i.e.,
given u0. It is convenient to rewrite the program as follows:
L (u0) = max{τO0 ∈[0,1]}
½
βµ (1− u0)
¡
1− τO0
¢
+ (β + λ) aµ (1− u0) τO0 +
L
1− λ
¾
, (5)
where
L = max
{τY ∈[0,1],τO∈[0,1]}
n
λµ
³
e∗
¡
τY , τO
¢ ¡
1− τY + β ¡1− τO¢¢− ¡e∗ ¡τY , τO¢¢2´ +
(β + λ) aµe∗
¡
τY , τO
¢
τY + λ (β + λ) aµe∗
¡
τY , τO
¢
τO
ª
. (6)
In plain words, after the initial choice of τO0 , the problem reduces to a sequence of identical
static optimizations over τY and τO, without any state variable.2
The solution to the program (5) is straightforward, since τO0 has no distortionary eﬀects
and there is no interaction with future variables. Each dollar of taxes levied on a proportion
µ (1− u0) of old agents provides all living agents, both young and old, with aµ (1− u0) utils
from public good consumption. The planner sets 100% taxation if a > min {β, λ} / (β + λ),
and zero taxation for a smaller than this amount.
Next, consider the continuation program (6). As mentioned above, λ parameterizes the
inter-generational bias of the planner. If λ→ 1, she maximizes the average expected utility
of young agents, i.e., µV y + (1− µ)V yl. This is a counterpart to the golden rule in our
model. If instead λ→ 0, the planner fully discounts future generations and maximizes the
average ex-post utility of old agents. That is, she maximizes e∗
¡
τY , τO
¢
τY ; the amount
of public good that the old can extract by taxing the young. The knife-edge case λ = β
corresponds to a perfectly utilitarian planner with the same regard for the ex-post utility
of old agents as for the ex-ante utility of future generations.
The next Proposition characterizes the Ramsey allocation.
Proposition 1
If a ≤ min {β, λ} / (β + λ), then the Ramsey allocation, deÞned by the recursive formulation
(5)-(6), has τO0 = τ
Y = τO = 0 and no public good provision. Otherwise, the Ramsey
allocation has τO0 = 1, a constant sequence of taxes, τ
Y and τO, and a present value of
public good provision, PV gR (net of the tax revenues from the initial old (1− u0) τO0 ), given
by the following:
2More speciÞcally, for any t ≥ 0, we have τYt = τY and τOt+1 = τO.
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1. If β > λ, then,
τY = (1 + β)
a− λβ+λ
2a− λβ+λ
,
τO = 0,
PV gR =
(1 + β)2
2
µ
1− λ · f
µ
a,
λ
β + λ
¶
,
where f (a, x) ≡ a (a− x) (2a− x)−2 ≥ 0.
2. If β < λ, then
(a) If a ∈
h
β
(β+λ) ,
β
(1−β)(β+λ)
i
, then
τY = 0,
τO =
1 + β
β
a− ββ+λ
2a− ββ+λ
,
PV gR =
(1 + β)2
2
λ
β
µ
1− λ · f
µ
a,
β
β + λ
¶
.
(b) If a ∈
h
β
(1−β)(β+λ) ,
λ
(1−λ)(β+λ)
i
, then
τY = 0,
τO = 1,
PV gR =
λ
2
µ
1− λ.
(c) If a > λ(1−λ)(β+λ) , then
τY =
a (1− λ)− λβ+λ
2a− λβ+λ
,
τO = 1,
PV gR =
(1 + λ)2
2
µ
1− λ · f
µ
a,
λ
β + λ
¶
.
3. If β = λ, then
τY + βτO =
(2a− 1) (1 + β)
4a− 1 ,
PV gR =
(1 + λ)2
2
µ
1− λ · f
µ
a,
1
2
¶
.
< Figure 1 about here >
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Figure 1 shows the tax rates in the Ramsey allocations as a function of λ, which illus-
trates all cases of Proposition 1. On the left-hand side of β, i.e. part 1 of the proposition,
the tax burden falls on the young (in both panels). On the right-hand side of β (part 2 ),
most of the tax burden falls on the old. Part 2a is represented by an intermediate range
of λ in the left panel (small a), part 2b is represented by the ßat segments for TO on the
right-hand side of β (in both panels), and part 2c is represented by an intermediate range of
λ in the right panel (large a). Finally, for λ = β (part 3 ), the tax rates are indeterminate.
To get some intuition for Proposition 1, consider the knife-edge utilitarian case, β = λ.
In this case, the planner chooses x ≡ τY + βτO (i.e., the present value of taxation faced by
each young agent) so as to maximize
L¯(x) =
³
e∗ (x) (1 + β − x)− (e∗ (x))2
´
+ 2ae∗ (x)x,
where the Þrst term captures the cost of taxation while the second term captures its beneÞts.
Using the envelope theorem, the optimal solution simpliÞes to e∗ (x) = a (1 + β − 2x),
equalizing the marginal cost of taxation with the marginal beneÞt of public good provision.
In this knife-edge case, the planner is indiﬀerent as to how to split the tax burden between
the young and the old (see also Figure 1). In contrast, the present value of public good
provision is determinate. When β 6= λ, however, the split ceases to be indeterminate, since
it has inter-generational distributional eﬀects, about which the planner cares. In particular,
shifting the tax burden towards the young (old) increases (decreases) the ex-post utility of
the old agents at the expense (in favor of) the future generations.
Consider, in particular, the two polar opposite cases. If λ→ 0, then the planner wishes
to maximizes the public good Þnanced by the young, i.e., she maximizes e∗
¡
τY , τO
¢
τY
(see equation (6)). This is achieved by setting τO = 0 and choosing τY so as to attain,
conditional on such a choice, the top of the Laﬀer curve.3 Conversely, if λ→ 1, the planner
maximizes the ex-ante utility of the young, and prefers to tax the old. The reason is that
individual agents discount the eﬀects of future taxation when deciding on their investment,
thereby implying that taxes on the old are less distortionary.
< Figure 2 about here >
Figure 2 displays the present value of public good provision PV gR as a function of a
in the three diﬀerent cases of Proposition 1. The present value of public good provision
in the Ramsey allocation has the intuitive property that for any β and λ, it is monotone
3Another way of illustrating the result in this limit case is the following. When λ = 0, the planner only
cares about the utility of the old at time zero. Thus, she sets τO1 = 0, since future taxation is of no value
for the current old, but distorts the incentives of the young.
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increasing in the marginal utility, a (this is shown in the proof of Proposition 1). Moreover,
for suﬃciently low a, public good provision is zero. Note that even though the present value
of public good provision is monotone increasing in a, the steady-state provision of public
good is not necessarily monotone.
An interesting question is what allocation would be chosen by a planner caring only
about the low-ability agents in society (a Rawlsian planner). It turns out that this coin-
cides with the Ramsey allocation in Proposition 1 when the public good becomes arbitrarily
important, i.e. the case when a→∞. In this case, the planner seeks to maximize the public
good provision or, equivalently, maximize the tax revenues. The solution to this program
is characterized in the following corollary and stems from letting a → ∞ in part 2c of
Proposition 1.
Corollary 1
The Rawlsian planner allocation has τO0 = 1, and the following public good provision and
constant sequence of taxes, τY and τO:
1. If β > λ, then τY = (1 + β) /2, τO = 0, and PV g = (1+β)
2
8
µ
1−λ ;
2. If β < λ, then τY = (1− λ) /2, τO = 1, and PV g = (1+λ)28 µ(1−λ) ;
3. If β = λ, then τY + βτO = (1 + β) /2 and PV g = (1+λ)
2
8
µ
(1−λ) .
The proof follows immediately from Proposition 1 and is omitted.
Both the Ramsey and the Rawlsian allocation assume that the planner can commit to
future tax sequences. We conclude this section by characterizing the choice of a planner
without a commitment technology. This time-consistent planning allocation is interesting,
because the lack of commitment is an inherent feature of political equilibria, as discussed
in section 4.
The following Proposition characterizes the time-consistent Ramsey allocation.
Proposition 2
If a ≤ min {β, λ} / (β + λ), then the time-consistent Ramsey allocation has τO0 = τY =
τO = 0 and no public good provision. Otherwise, the time-consistent Ramsey allocation
features τO0 = τ
O = 1 and
1. If a 5 λ(1−λ)(β+λ) , then τY = 0 and PV gTC =
λ
2
µ
1−λ .
2. If a > λ(1−λ)(β+λ) , then τ
Y =
a(1−λ)− λ
β+λ
2a− λ
β+λ
∈ £0, 1−λ2 ¤ and PV gTC = (1+λ)22 µ1−λ ·
f
³
a, λβ+λ
´
, where f is deÞned in Proposition 1.
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If a ≥ β/ (β + λ) then, ex-post, the planner would like to set τO = 1. Thus, the proof
amounts to solving (6) for τY , subject to τO = 1. Time inconsistency arises whenever the
Ramsey allocation prescribes less than full taxation of the old. Hence, this problem arises
when she either has a pro-old bias (i.e., for small λ), or when the marginal utility of public
good consumption is suﬃciently low, i.e., a < β/ [(1− β) (β + λ)]. In the latter case, the
planner would promise, ex-ante, a lower taxation of the old, but would have an incentive,
after investment decisions are sunk, to increase the taxation to 100%.
Finally, the time-consistent Rawlsian planner allocation is given by the time-consistent
planner allocation in Proposition 2 when a→∞, namely τO0 = τO = 1 and τY = (1− λ) /2.
4 Political equilibrium
In this section, we characterize the equilibrium tax sequence when policies are set through
repeated voting. Agents vote on taxation period-by-period. As a benchmark, we assume
that elections are held at the end of each period, and that the politician who is elected
sets the tax rates for the following period. The old have no interests at stake and are
assumed to abstain, a timing which emphasizes the predominance of ex-post interests in
determining political outcomes. If agents voted at the beginning of the period in our two-
period framework, Þfty percent of voters would not yet have decided on their human capital
investment. In any generalization with more than two periods, however, it would be natural
to assume that the majority of voters had already undertaken such investment. Therefore,
our timing assumption is a natural way of avoiding this artifact of the two-period model,
which is observationally equivalent to assuming that agents vote over current taxes at the
beginning of each period, but that only the old vote. For expositional ease, we keep the
latter interpretation in the presentation. In section 6, we explore the case when all agents
vote over current taxation at the beginning of each period.
We focus on Markov perfect equilibria, where the state of the economy is summarized by
the proportion of current poor old agents (ut). A convenient feature of the model is that the
public good provision, gt, is additively separable in two components, i.e., gt = GO
¡
τOt , ut
¢
+
GY
¡
τYt , τ
O
t+1
¢
, where GO
¡
τOt , ut
¢
= µ (1− ut) τOt and GY
¡
τYt , τ
O
t+1
¢
= µe∗
¡
τYt , τ
O
t+1
¢
τYt
represent the part of the public good Þnanced by the old and the young, respectively. This
implies that the preferences of all voters at t can be expressed as a term depending on τOt
and ut (but no future variables) and a term depending on τYt and τ
O
t+1 (but no variable
which is predetermined at t). An implication of this separability is that the state of the
economy, ut, only aﬀects the political choice of τOt . Preferences over τ
Y
t and τ
O
t+1 are,
instead, entirely forward-looking and independent of the state variable.
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More explicitly, the utility of the old rich and poor, respectively, can be rewritten as
V os
¡
ut, τ
O
t , τ
Y
t , τ
O
t+1
¢
= W os
¡
ut, τ
O
t
¢
+ Zo
¡
τYt , τ
O
t+1
¢
(7)
V ou
¡
ut, τ
O
t , τ
Y
t , τ
O
t+1
¢
= W ou
¡
ut, τ
O
t
¢
+ Zo
¡
τYt , τ
O
t+1
¢
,
where
W ou
¡
ut, τ
O
t
¢
= aµ (1− ut) τOt (8)
W os
¡
ut, τ
O
t
¢
= 1− τOt +W ou
¡
ut, τ
O
t
¢
(9)
Zo
¡
τYt , τ
O
t+1
¢
= aµe∗
¡
τYt , τ
O
t+1
¢
τYt . (10)
For expositional simplicity, we mainly focus on the case a < 1/µ (although in Propo-
sition 3 below, Markov equilibria are characterized for any value of a). This implies that
whatever the level of ut, the old rich would never tax themselves in order to Þnance the
public good provision. Thus, there is an intra-generational political conßict among the old
voters: the rich prefer zero taxes on the old, while the poor prefer 100% taxation. However,
irrespective of a, the old agents preferences over τYt are perfectly aligned: they wish to
maximize Zo(τYt , τ
O
t+1), i.e., to attain the top of the Laﬀer curve.
This separability simpliÞes the deÞnition of the equilibrium. We use the superscript
dec to refer to the decisive voter. The identity of such a voter depends on the political
mechanism and the state of the economy and will be speciÞed as we proceed.
DeÞnition 1 A (Markov perfect) political equilibrium is deÞned as a triplet of functions­
TO, T Y , U
®
, where TO : [0, 1] → [0, 1] and T Y are two public policy rules, τOt = TO (ut)
and τYt = T
Y , and U : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is a private decision rule, ut+1 = U
¡
τYt
¢
, such that
the following functional equations hold:
1. TO (ut) = argmaxτOt ∈[0,1]W
dec
¡
τOt , ut
¢
.
2. T Y = argmaxτYt ∈[0,1] Z
o
¡
τYt , τ
O
t+1
¢
subject to τOt+1 = T
O
¡
U
¡
τYt
¢¢
.
3. U
¡
τYt
¢
= 1− e∗ ¡τYt , τOt+1¢ , with τOt+1 = TO ¡U ¡τYt ¢¢.
The Þrst equilibrium condition requires that τOt maximizes the utility of the decisive
old voter, W dec. As discussed above, the optimal choice of τOt is independent of τ
Y
t and
any future variables. The second equilibrium condition requires that even τYt maximizes
the objective function of the decisive voter. Given our voting set-up, we have that Zdec =
Zo. Rational voters understand that their choice over current redistribution aﬀects future
redistribution via the private decision rule and public policy rules. In equilibrium, τYt = T
Y
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is constant, since W dec does not depend on the state variable. The third equilibrium
condition implies that all young individuals optimally choose their investment, given τYt
and τOt+1, and that agents hold rational expectations about future taxes and distributions
of types.
Note that the three equilibrium conditions can be solved recursively. First, condition
1 deÞnes a one-to-one mapping from the state variable, ut, to the equilibrium choice of
taxation of the old, i.e., τOt = T
O (ut) . Second, condition 3 deÞnes a functional equation
whose solution is the optimal investment schedule, as a function of the current taxation of
the young. More explicitly, suppose that agents believe that the future taxation of the old
is set according to TO (.), and that future private investment decisions are taken according
to U
¡
τYt
¢
. Then, the optimal current investment decisions are also set according to the
same function, U
¡
τYt
¢
. There is no guarantee that this functional equation has a unique
solution; in fact, we will show that for a range of parameter values, multiple Þxed points
exist. Finally, consider condition 2. Suppose agents believe the future taxation of the old
to be set according to the function TO (ut) and the mapping from current taxation of the
young to future distribution to be given by U
¡
τYt
¢
. Condition 2 then deÞnes an optimal
choice of taxation today, as a function of the state variable ut. The strategic voting motive
arises from agents recognizing that τYt aﬀects τ
O
t+1 via equilibrium policies T
O (.) and U (.) .
5 Equilibrium under majority voting.
Assume the political decisions are made though majority voting where voters elect an
oﬃce-seeking politician proposing income tax rates on the old and the young. In general,
the presence of multiple issues can give rise to Condorcet cycles. This problem does not
arise in our set-up, however, since there are only two groups of voters (rich and poor old
agents). Therefore, under majority voting, the winning politician chooses τYt and τ
O
t , so as
to maximize, respectively, Zo(τYt , T
O
¡
U
¡
τYt
¢¢
) and
W dec
¡
τOt , ut
¢
=

W os(τOt , ut) if µ (1− ut) ≥ 0.5
W ou(τOt , ut) if µ (1− ut) < 0.5.
(11)
Given (11), the equilibrium mapping TO (u) (see equilibrium condition 1) is as follows:
TO (u) =

0 if ut ≤ 1− 12µ
1 if ut > 1− 12µ .
(12)
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In words, a majority of rich high-ability agents sets τOt+1 = 0, whereas a majority of poor
(high-ability and low-ability) agents sets τOt+1 = 1.
Next, we rewrite equilibrium condition 3 by substituting in the optimal eﬀort e∗
¡
τYt , τ
O
t+1
¢
.
This yields the following functional equation
U
¡
τY
¢
=
¡
1− β + τY + βTO ¡U ¡τY ¢¢¢ /2, (13)
where TO (.) ∈ {0, 1} is given by (12). Let U∗ denote the set of solutions to this functional
equation. That is, each element U ∈ U∗ is a function U : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] solving (13). Since
TO (.) ∈ {0, 1}, it immediately follows from (13) that any function U ∈ U∗ must satisfy
U
¡
τY
¢ ∈ ©¡1− β + τY ¢ /2, ¡1 + τY ¢ /2ª ∀τY ∈ [0, 1] .
We can now state the following Lemma
Lemma 1 Let U ∈ U∗. Then, for any τY > β − (1− µ) /µ, the function U satisÞes
U
¡
τY
¢
=
¡
1 + τY
¢
/2 > 1/2 and TO
¡
U
¡
τY
¢¢
= 1.
An immediate implication of Lemma 1 is that, if β < (1− µ) /µ, the set U∗ is a singleton,
U∗ = {U∗−}, where the function U∗− is deÞned as
U∗−
¡
τY
¢
=
¡
1 + τY
¢
/2, ∀τY ∈ [0, 1]. (14)
Next, consider the set of solutions to (13) with the property that θ is the largest value
of τY producing a majority of rich agents in the following period. More formally, given a
θ ∈ [0, 1],
U∗θ ≡
©
U ∈ U∗ | U (θ) = (1− β + θ) /2 ≤ 1− 1/ (2µ) and U ¡τY ¢ = ¡1 + τY ¢ /2 ∀τY ∈ (θ, 1]ª .
(15)
In words, for any function U being an element of U∗θ , θ is the largest tax rate on the
young for which it is rational to expect a future majority of rich agents. The expectations
could also be such that a majority of poor agents materialize if τY is larger or equal to
some threshold tax-rate θ. We therefore deÞne
U∗θ ≡
½
U ∈ U∗ | lim
τY→θ−
U
¡
τY
¢
= (1− β + θ) /2 ≤ 1− 1/ (2µ) and U ¡τY ¢ = ¡1 + τY ¢ /2 ∀τY ∈ [θ, 1]¾ .
From the deÞnition in (15), it follows that the sets U∗θ and U
∗
θ are non-empty if and
only if U (θ) ≤ 1− 1/ (2µ), i.e., if and only if 0 ≤ θ ≤ β − (1− µ) /µ. Therefore, from (15),
it follows that the union of the set of subsets U∗θ , U
∗
θ over θ ∈ [0, β − (1− µ) /µ] and U∗−
partitions the set U∗, i.e.,
U∗ = U∗− ∪ ∪
θ∈[0,β−(1−µ)/µ]
n
U∗θ ∪ U∗θ
o
. (16)
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Next, consider the second equilibrium condition in DeÞnition 1. The preferences of the
decisive voter over τY depend on the private investment behavior, U
¡
τY
¢
. Consider, Þrst,
the case U
¡
τY
¢
= U∗−. Voters then realize that they cannot aﬀect the identity of the future
median voter, since a majority of old poor agents will emerge, irrespective of their choice
of τY . In this case,
T Y |U∗−= arg max
τYt ∈[0,1]
Zo
¡
τYt , 1
¢
= 1/2. (17)
Thus, the equilibrium features τY = 1/2 and τO = 1 (except in the Þrst period, when
τO0 = 1 if the poor are in majority and zero otherwise). This equilibrium is sincere
in the sense that agents do not use current policy strategically in order to reduce future
redistribution, but instead indulge in high current taxation.
Consider now the case Uθ ∈ U∗θ for some θ ∈ [0, β − (1− µ) /µ]. In contrast to the
above case, agents now have the option to aﬀect the identity of the median voter in the
next period. Namely, they can choose τYt so as to trigger a future majority of rich who
will set τOt+1 = 0. This may be attractive, since Z
o is decreasing in τOt+1. The next lemma
characterizes the set of strategic equilibria.
Lemma 2 Assume a < 1/µ. For any θ ∈
h
θ (β) , β − (1− µ) /µ
i
, where θ (β) ≡
³
1 + β −pβ (2 + β)´ /2,
there exists a strategic equilibrium
­
TO, TY , U
®
such that U
¡
τY
¢
= Uθ ∈ U∗θ (where
Uθ ≤ 1− 1/ (2µ)), TY = θ, and TO (ut) is given by (12).4
Lemma 2 shows that, conditional on pursuing the strategy of inducing τOt+1 = 0, the
decisive voter opts for the maximum taxation of the young, consistent with a future majority
of rich, i.e., she sets τYt = θ. To understand the requirement on θ, observe that, given
U ∈ U∗θ , inducing τOt+1 = 0 is optimal if and only if
Zo (θ, 0) ≥ max
τYt ∈[0,1]
Zo
¡
τYt , 1
¢
,
which is equivalent to the requirement
θ ≥
³
1 + β −
p
β (2 + β)
´
/2 = θ (β) .
Lemma 2 implies that necessary and suﬃcient conditions for a strategic equilibrium to
exist are that the set
h
θ (β) , β − (1− µ) /µ
i
be non-empty and a < 1/µ. The former holds
if and only if
β ≥ (2− µ)
2
4µ
≥ 1
4
. (18)
4Note that a strategic equilibrium cannot feature U ∈ U∗θ , since there is no solution to the maximization
problem in part 2 of DeÞnition 1.
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Since a sincere equilibrium always exists, a < 1/µ and (18) are necessary and suﬃcient
conditions for multiple equilibria. Hence, for smaller values of β, the unique equilibrium
features u > 1− 1/ (2µ) and τO = 1.
The next Proposition summarizes the results discussed so far (proof in the text).
Proposition 3 Assume majority voting. Then,
1. if β < (2− µ)2 / (4µ) and a ≤ 1/µ, the Markov equilibrium is unique and is charac-
terized as follows: TO (ut) is given as in (12), TY = 1/2, and either U
¡
τY
¢ ∈ U∗− or
U
¡
τY
¢ ∈ U∗θ ∪ U∗θ with θ < θ (β). Along the equilibrium path, ∀j ∈ [0,∞), τYj = 1/2,
τOj+1 = 1, uj = 3/4 > 1− 1/ (2µ), and gj = 3µ/8.
2. If β ≥ (2− µ)2 / (4µ) and a ≤ 1/µ, there exist multiple Markov equilibria. These are
of two types:
(a) The Þrst equilibrium (sincere equilibrium) is characterized as in part 1 of the
proposition.
(b) The second set of equilibria (strategic equilibria) is characterized as follows:
TO (ut) is given as in (12), T Y = θ, and U
¡
τY
¢ ∈ U∗θ , where θ ∈ [θ (β) , β −
(1− µ) /µ]. Along the equilibrium path, ∀j ∈ [0,∞), τYt+j = θ, τOt+1+j = 0,
uj = 1/2− (β − θ) /2 ≤ 1− 1/ (2µ), and gj = µ (1 + β − θ) θ/2.
3. If a > 1/µ, the Markov equilibrium is unique and identical to the sincere equilibrium
(in part 1 of the proposition) with U = U∗−, except that TO ≡ 1.
The key element in Proposition 3 is the existence of multiple self-fulÞlling private in-
vestment rules, U
¡
τY
¢
. Figures 3, 4 and 5 provide, respectively, an illustration of a sincere
and a strategic equilibrium.
< Figures 3, 4 and 5 about here >
The left-hand panels of the Þgures correspond to a sincere equilibrium while the right-
hand panels illustrate a strategic equilibrium for one particular θ. Figure 3 shows the tax
rate on the old (TO (ut)) and the young (TY ) as functions of ut. Two important properties
of the equilibrium tax rates should be noted. First, TO (ut) is the same in both equilibria
and, in accordance with equation (12), prescribes that zero taxation be chosen if there
is a majority of old rich agents (i.e., ut ≤ 1 − 1/ (2µ)), and 100% taxation be chosen
otherwise. Second, TY diﬀers across equilibria; in particular, T Y = 1/2 ≥ θ (β) in the
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sincere equilibrium, while T Y = θ in the strategic equilibrium (where θ may be larger or
smaller than 1/2, depending on the parameters).
Figure 4 plots the decision rules, U
¡
τY
¢
. Note the central role of expectations about
how young agents react to current taxation. In the sincere equilibrium (left-hand panel),
agents expect that a majority of old rich can only materialize at a low current taxation of
the young (U
¡
τY
¢ ∈ U∗θ with θ < θ (β)). In strategic equilibria (right-hand panel), agents
expect that a majority of old rich can materialize for a relatively high current taxation of
the young (U
¡
τY
¢ ∈ U∗θ with θ ≥ θ (β)).
It is instructive to study how this role of expectations aﬀects the utility of the old from
taxing the young, Zo. This is shown in Figure 5. First, in the sincere equilibrium illustrated
here (left-hand panel), it is feasible to induce a majority of old rich agents in the next period,
but in order to achieve this, current taxes on the young must be suppressed below θ (β).
That would be inferior to opting for τY = 1/2, which attains the top of the Laﬀer curve,
given the expectation that τOt+1 = 1. However, when θ ≥ θ (β) (and U
¡
τY
¢ ∈ U∗θ ), the
right-hand panel of Figure 5, it is beneÞcial to induce a majority of rich agents in the next
period. Note also that the old are indiﬀerent between the two equilibria when θ = θ (β).
Consider now the public good provision in political equilibria. First, political equilibria
always deliver a positive provision in steady-state, bounded from below by µ/8, the lowest
provision in strategic equilibria. The public good provision in sincere equilibria always
exceeds this minimum provision in strategic equilibria (since µ/8 < 3µ/8). The reason
why political equilibria provide public goods for any a > 0, is that the political conßict
over redistribution is the only force driving equilibrium taxation (except for the fact that
strategic equilibria vanish for a ≥ 1/µ). Equivalently, the provision of public good is the
only way for the old to obtain inter-generational redistribution from the young. Moreover,
with majority voting, votes are not weighted by marginal utility, so in equilibrium, taxes
and public good provision are actually independent of a.5
However, although sincere equilibria feature a higher taxation of the old, they do not
necessarily deliver a larger public good provision than strategic equilibria.6 The reason is
that the maximum of the Laﬀer curve with respect to τY moves to the right when agents
expect zero future taxation of the old. Assume, for example, that µ = 1 and β = 1. Then,
the strategic equilibrium with the largest public good provision has g = 1/2 > 3/8, where
5 In Section 6.2, we consider a diﬀerent voting mechanism, probabilistic voting, where political choices
are aﬀected by the value of public goods and the provision turns out to be generally increasing in a.
6 It is straightforward to show that the maximum present value, computed using a discount factor λ,
of public good provision in strategic equilibria is larger than its sincere equilibrium counterpart whenever
β > µλ/2 + (2− µ)2 / (4µ).
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the latter is the level of public good in the sincere equilibrium.
The normative implications for public good provision in democracies depend on the
marginal utility of the public good a. In particular, since the political equilibria are, as
discussed above, independent of a, while the Ramsey allocation is increasing in a and in
fact commands zero public good whenever a ≤ min{β, λ}/ (β + λ), it immediately follows
that the political allocations over-supply public goods for suﬃciently low a (see Proposition
1).
Another important normative result can also be proved; for suﬃciently large a, the
political equilibrium does not deliver enough public goods compared to the Ramsey allo-
cations.7 One reason for this is that the maximum amount of tax revenues that can be
sustained is larger in the Ramsey allocation than in the political equilibria, since one can-
not commit to future taxation in the political equilibria. Indeed, in the time-consistent
allocation, the public good provision converges to µ1−λ (1 + λ)
2 /8 as a → ∞, which is less
than the (Rawlsian) Ramsey allocation.
We now examine normative aspects of political equilibria in more detail. First, the
sincere equilibrium bears some resemblance to the Ramsey allocations in the case of λ > β,
where the main tax burden falls on the old (see Proposition 1). There are two diﬀerences,
though. First, when a is low, the Ramsey planner does not tax the old at the maximum
rate  the same discrepancy as that between the Ramsey and the time-consistent Ramsey
allocation of Proposition 2. Second, in the Ramsey allocation with λ > β, the young
are subject to a tax τY ≤ (1− λ) /2, while they are taxed at a 50% rate in the sincere
equilibrium.
Next, consider the Rawlsian planner allocation in the limit case when λ → 1, i.e. the
allocation that maximizes the steady-state provision of public good. This requires τO = 1
and τY = 0. In comparison, the sincere equilibrium imposes a larger tax burden and
delivers less public goods (except for the initial period). The reason for this excess taxation
of the young is that voters have a short life horizon. Taxing the young is a liability on
future generations that is not internalized by the current generation of voters. As a result,
each generation inherits a narrower tax-base than that required to maximize the provision
of public good. Thus, in a dynamic sense, the sincere equilibrium is on the wrong side of
the Laﬀer curve, due to the inability to commit future policy outcomes. Still, in the absence
of transferable utility, a Pareto improvement is not possible since the initial old generation
7This can be seen by comparing the present value of public good provision, using a discount factor of
λ. This Þgure is NPV gS = 2λ+18
µ
1−λ for sincere equilibria and NPV gθ ∈
h
1
8
µ
1−λ ,
β
2
µ
1−λ
i
for strategic
equilibria. It is straightforward to verify that, for suﬃciently large a, these Þgures are smaller than their
Ramsey counterparts of Proposition 1.
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would have to be made worse oﬀ in order to improve future eﬃciency.
Consider now strategic equilibria. These resemble the Ramsey allocations with low λ,
where the entire tax burden falls on the young. Note, though, that the Ramsey allocation of
Proposition 1 (as well as the Rawlsian allocation of Corollary 1) commands τY = (1 + β) /2,
whereas, in a strategic equilibrium, τY = θ < (1 + β) /2. Therefore, if a is suﬃciently
large, strategic equilibria feature an ineﬃciently low provision of public good compared
to the allocation maximizing the average utility of voters. The reasons is that old voters
are subject to the political constraint that old rich agents remain in majority over time.
However, if voters were to set τYt = (1 + β) /2, as in their preferred Ramsey allocation,
then e∗t ≤ 1 − (1 + β) /4 ≤ 1/2 and a majority of rich agents would not arise in the next
period. Thus, the political constraint that τYt ≤ θ limits the extent to which the current
generation of voters can extract a surplus from future generations. Interestingly, the public
good provision of the Rawlsian time-consistent planner is actually smaller than that of the
sincere equilibrium when λ is suﬃciently low, i.e. when the time-consistency problem is
the largest (for example when β = µ = 1 and λ < 1). The reason is that, while a majority
of rich old agents do not want to tax themselves (for a < 1/µ), the time-consistent planner
starts taxing the old already for a = min{β, λ}/(β+ λ), even though a commitment to not
taxing the old would yield more public goods.
Finally, we examine which political equilibrium provides the diﬀerent groups of living
with the highest welfare. Provided that β is suﬃciently high, old voters prefer a strategic
equilibrium where θ = β − (1− µ) /µ. Namely, if they could manipulate the expectations
of the young, they would make them believe that the welfare state is very fragile. As far
as the high-ability young agents are concerned, their expected utility is given by
V y =
¡
e∗
¡
τY , τO
¢¢2
/2 + a (1 + β) g.
As discussed above, the young prefer a tax structure qualitatively similar to that of the
sincere equilibrium. However, that equilibrium features too high taxation compared with
their preferred Ramsey allocation (i.e., when λ → 1). Therefore, the result is a priori
ambiguous. The expected utility in the two classes of equilibria is
V ySinc = 1/16 + 3µa (1 + β) /8
V yStrat (θ) = (1 + β − θ)2 /4 + µa (1 + β) (1 + β − θ) θ/2,
and there exist parameters such that V ySinc > V
y
Strat (θ), as well as the converse.
8
8For instance, set µ = 1 and let a → 1, and consider strategic equilibria where θ = β. In this case,
V ySinc → 1/16 + 3 (1 + β) /8 whereas V yStrat → 1/4 + (1 + β)β/2, so V ySinc > V yStrat for β < 0.5, whereas
V ySinc <
V yStrat for β > 0.5.
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The low-ability young, Þnally, only care about the provision of the public good. The
stationary tax schedule maximizing g is given by τY = 0 and τO = 1. Hence, the most
preferred tax policy of low and high-ability young workers are similar, and are in fact
identical when a is suﬃciently large.
We can establish the following general result. If β < 0.5, and µa→ 1, then the sincere
equilibrium is preferred by all agents in the economy, except the old rich. In particular, all
agents prefer, ex-ante, to be in a sincere equilibrium.
Throughout the paper we focus on Markov equilibria. Other equilibria, however, exist.
A more comprehensive analysis of the set of equilibria can be carried out using the method-
ology proposed by Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1990). A key step in their methodology
is to characterize the worst equilibrium. Once such equilibrium is found, one can easily
retrieve the range of utilities that can be sustained by credible plans. In our model, char-
acterizing the worst equilibrium is particularly simple, since the most severe punishment
that the old voters in period t can be subject to is that the current young be taxed at 100%
in period t + 1. Therefore, if the old in period t deviate from some proposed equilibrium,
they expect to be punished with τOt+1 = 1, and, hence, the best deviation must involve
setting τYt = 1/2. The worst equilibrium is then identical to the sincere equilibrium. An
implication of this observation is that, when β < (2− µ)2 / (4µ) , the sincere equilibrium is
unique even if one considers non-Markov equilibria (see Proposition 3).
6 Alternative timing: all agents vote on current tax rates.
In this section, we characterize equilibria in the case when both the old and the young
vote on current tax rates, before investment decisions are made. In this case, the presence
of multiple issues and more than two groups of voters may lead to Condorcet voting-
cycles. To avoid this issue, we consider two settings where this problem does not arise.
In the Þrst, voters cast ballots separately on the two issues. In the second, we assume
probabilistic voting, following Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) (see Persson and Tabellini,
2000, for a textbook description).
6.1 Majority voting.
In order to rule out Condorcet voting-cycles, this section considers an institutional set-up
inspired by the notion of structure-induced equilibrium proposed by Shepsle (1979) (see also
Conde-Ruiz and Galasso, 2002, for an application). To this end, we assume that agents
vote separately and simultaneously for a politician in charge of setting taxation on the old
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and another in charge of setting taxation on the young.9 We show the existence of a unique
voting equilibrium in this environment by showing that two conditions hold:
1. For all t ≥ 0, the vote over τOt yields an unambiguous Condorcet winner, i.e., τOt = 1,
irrespective of any past, present or future circumstance.
2. For all t ≥ 0 the vote over τYt yields an unambiguous Condorcet winner, given the
equilibrium sequence for
n
τOj
o∞
j=0
.
When both young and old vote, there will always be a strict majority supporting full
taxation of the old rich, i.e., τOt = 1, since this taxation is non-distortionary and beneÞts
all agents but the old rich. Since this is a dominant strategy for the majority in any period
t, condition 1 is satisÞed.
In order to show condition 2, we need to check that all agents preferences are single-
peaked with respect to τYt , conditional on
n
τOj = 1
o∞
j=0
. To this end, observe that the
indirect utility of old agents is given by (7), while the indirect utility of young low-ability
and high-ability agents can be written as
V yl =W ou
¡
ut, τ
O
t
¢
+ Zy
¡
τYt , τ
O
t+1
¢
+ βZo
¡
τYt+1, τ
O
t+2
¢
, (19)
and
V y = e∗
¡
τYt , τ
O
t+1
¢ ¡
1− τYt + β
¡
1− τOt+1
¢¢− e∗ ¡τYt , τOt+1¢2 + V yl, (20)
where Zy
¡
τYt , τ
O
t+1
¢
= aµe∗
¡
τYt , τ
O
t+1
¢ ¡
τYt + βτ
O
t+1
¢
and W ou and Zo are as in (8) and
(10), respectively.
Consider now how τYt aﬀects the utility for diﬀerent groups. We know, by condition 1,
that τOt+1 = 1, independently of τ
Y
t . Therefore, there is no scope for strategic voting in this
game. The following Lemma can then be established.
Lemma 3 Conditional on τOt+1 = 1, all agents have single-peaked preferences with respect
to τYt . The most preferred alternative for old agents, both rich and poor, is τ
Y
t = 1/2.
The most preferred alternative for young low-ability agents is τYt = (1− β) /2. The most
preferred alternative for young high-ability agents is τYt = 0.
Next, we need to identify the median voter for the choice of τYt . In our model, 50% of
the voters are old and, by Lemma 3, vote for τYt = 1/2. The remaining 50%, however,
would prefer a lower τYt . Thus, we must specify a tie-break rule. If the tie-break rule were
9As will be clear below, the order of the elections is of no importance in our model. Therefore, the
assumption of simultaneous voting entails no loss of generality.
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to favor the young (for example, if there is population growth), the young low-ability would
be pivotal, and the unique equilibrium outcome would be τY = (1− β) /2. If the tie-break
rule were, instead, to favor the old, the unique equilibrium would prescribe τY = 1/2.
In conclusion, this extension shows that a diﬀerent timing of voting granting political
inßuence to the young eliminates strategic equilibria, and results in a unique political
equilibrium similar to the sincere voting equilibrium of Proposition 3. The reason for this
result is that when the young participate in the determination of current period taxation,
the old rich can never escape high taxation. Note that this would remain true even under
parameters such that the eﬃcient provision of public good would be zero, i.e., for small as.
The result that empowering the young can increase the size of the welfare state con-
trasts with the results of HRSZ, where young voters would undermine the sustainability
of a transfer system. The reason is that, in that model, voters only have access to one
distortionary instrument  an age-independent transfer policy. Here, instead, the poor and
the young have, ex-post, an incentive to tax the rich old, since their investment decision is
sunk and, therefore, taxation entails no distortion ex-post. Note that if a is low, it would
be in the interest of the young to limit future taxation of the old since, ex-ante, this tax is
distortionary. However, this plan is time-inconsistent, and will not be implemented since
the political mechanism does not provide agents with any commitment device.
A Þnal remark concerns the robustness of our result to the speciÞc political mechanism
introduced in this section. In the case that µ < 1/2, and the tie-break rule were to favor
the young, the equilibrium outcome τYt = (1− β) /2 and τOt = 1 would be a Condorcet
winner even in a standard Downsian model where agents elect a single politician setting
both tax rates jointly. To prove this, consider an alternative platform such that τOt = 1− ε
and τYt = (1− β) /2+ ν, where ε and ν are non-negative deviations. Such a platform may,
at best, attract the vote of all old agents, but young agents would continue to support the
equilibrium platform. Under the speciÞed tie-break rule, the young are pivotal and the
equilibrium platform would still prevail. Consider, instead, the alternative τOt = 1− ε and
τYt = (1− β) /2 − ν. At best, such a platform would attract the old rich (i.e., a subset of
the old high-ability) and the young high ability agents. But, by assumption, low-ability
agents are in majority (µ < 1/2). Therefore, this alternative policy will not attract the
support of a majority.
6.2 Probabilistic voting.
We now consider the alternative institutional set-up of probabilistic voting. Under prob-
abilistic voting, agents are assumed to evaluate candidates both on their proposed tax
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rates and on some exogenous ideological traits. Agents are assumed to have heteroge-
neous preferences in the ideological dimension, where individuals are distributed according
to a diﬀerentiable distribution function. Compared to the standard Downsian framework,
probabilistic voting yields a smoother aggregation of preferences and the outcome can be ex-
pressed as if policy outcomes were based on maximizing the weighted average of individual
utilities, disregarding the ideological dimension. Weights depend on the relative strength of
preferences in the ideological dimension, i.e., how easily voters can be persuaded to switch
between candidates. Here, we will assume symmetry: within a cohort, the preferences over
ideological traits are identically and uniformly distributed for all groups. However, we do
allow for diﬀerences across age groups. In particular, we assume old agents preferences to
be at least as focused on taxation issues as those of young agents. This implies that the
young have relatively less (or possibly equal) inßuence in the determination of taxation.
We regard this as a plausible case. For instance, Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999) argue
that the elderly have a preponderant inßuence on the determination of redistribution poli-
cies, due to the old having a low opportunity cost of time. Moreover, voting turnout is,
empirically, lower for younger agents (see WolÞnger and Rosenstone (1980)).
More formally, under probabilistic voting, the winning politician maximizes
W dec = V pv = µ (1− ut)V os + (1− µ (1− ut))V ou + ωµV y + ω (1− µ)V yl, (21)
where ω ∈ [0, 1] denotes the political weight on the young. If ω = 1, all agents have the
same inßuence on the political outcome. The polar opposite case, ω = 0, represents a
case where the young have no inßuence, and can be regarded as the probabilistic voting
counterpart of the benchmark model of section 5. Substituting the expressions for V os,
V ou, V y, and V yl into (21) yields
V pv = µ (1− ut)
¡
1− τOt
¢
+ (1 + ω)W ou
¡
ut, τ
O
t
¢
+ Zo
¡
τYt , τ
O
t+1
¢
+ω
¡
Zy
¡
τYt , τ
O
t+1
¢
+ βZo
¡
τYt+1, τ
O
t+2
¢¢
+ωµ
³
e∗
¡
τYt , τ
O
t+1
¢ ¡
1− τYt + β
¡
1− τOt+1
¢¢− e∗ ¡τYt , τOt+1¢2´ .
Note that, as under majority voting, τOt is the only policy variable interacting with
the state variable, ut. Furthermore, preferences are additively separable in τOt versus other
taxes. A useful preliminary observation is that the partial derivative ∂V pv/∂τOt = −µ (1− ut)+
(1 + ω) aµ (1− ut) is positive (negative) if (1 + ω) a > (<) 1, implying that
τO = TO =
(
1 if a > 11+ω
0 if a ≤ 11+ω .
(22)
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Note that, under probabilistic voting, TO is invariant with respect to ut. The reason is
that the objective function V pv does not embed any concern for intra-generational redistri-
bution. Moreover, an increase in ω reduces the threshold above which the old are taxed at
100%. The intuition is straightforward: the young gain from taxing the old and the larger
their political inßuence, the more likely is the outcome τO = 1.
Setting τO as in (22), and maximizing V pv with respect to τYt , yields the following result
(proved in the appendix):
τY = T Y =

1
2 − ω aβ+1/22a+ω(2a−1) a ≥ max
n
1
1+ω ,
ω
1+ω(1−β)
o
(1+β)(a+ω(a−1))
2a(1+ω)−ω a ∈
³
ω
1+ω ,
1
1+ω
i
0 else.
(23)
< Figure 6 about here >
Figure 6 displays the equilibrium tax rates as a function of the marginal utility of the
public good, a. For a lower range, a ≤ ω/ (1 + ω), the young are subject to zero tax.
For an intermediate range, a ∈ [ω/ (1 + ω) , 1/ (1 + ω)], the tax rate τY is increasing in a.
For a > 1/ (1 + ω), however, agents forecast that τOt+1 = 1, and the optimal tax rate on
young τYt falls discontinuously and then increases. The lower panel shows the case when
the constraint τY ≥ 0 is binding (for a > 1/ (1 + ω)), and the upper panel shows the
unconstrained case.
This equilibrium is qualitatively similar to the time-consistent planner (see Proposition
2). In particular, both the time-consistent allocation and the probabilistic voting equi-
librium feature a falling tax on the young τY as the weight on future generations (in the
planner case) and the weight on the young (in the probabilistic voting equilibrium) increase.
Moreover, both the time-consistent allocation and the probabilistic voting equilibrium fea-
ture τO = 0 for low a and τO = 1 for large a.
It should also be noted that, while the equilibrium public good provision depends on
a, it is not necessarily monotone increasing. In particular, the public good provision is
non-decreasing in a within each of the segments of a; a ∈ [0, 1/ (1 + ω)] and a ∈
h
1
1+ω ,∞
´
,
but it may experience a discontinuous fall as a increases past 1/ (1 + ω).10
Finally, in contrast to the case in subsection 6.1 above, τY can actually be lower than
τO. This happens in the range a ∈
³
ω
1+ω ,
1
1+ω
i
(see Figure 6). The reason is that in this
intermediate range of a, where τO = 0, taxes on the young transfer resources to the old,
10For example, as ω → 0, the Þrst-period provision of public good, net of the taxation of the initial old,
converges to (1 + β)2 µ/8 for a ≤ 1/ (1 + ω) and to µ/8 for a > 1/ (1 + ω). Thus, for suﬃciently small
discount factor λ, the public good provision falls as a increases past 1/ (1 + ω).
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who are more inßuential in the political process when ω < 1. The range for a where τO
can be smaller than τY vanishes as ω approaches unity, as this removes the motive for
inter-generational transfers from the young to the old.
7 Conclusion
In spite of the increasing literature integrating politico-economic elements into macroeco-
nomic models, most of the existing contributions are silent on the role of forward-looking
politico-economic dynamics. Others incorporate them into the model, but rely on numer-
ical techniques (see e.g. Krusell and Ríos-Rull, 1996). In this paper we have analytically
characterized the set of Markov equilibria of a model with repeated voting over public good
provision, Þnanced by distortionary taxation. The politico-economic equilibrium allocations
have been contrasted with a set of Ramsey-optimal allocations.
We have shown that democracy can deliver too much or too little public goods, relative
to the Ramsey benchmark. The main reasons are that, Þrst, in political equilibria with
majority voting, taxes and public good provision are exclusively driven by redistributive
concerns. Second, voters cannot commit to future taxation, which limits the amount of
tax revenue that can be raised. For example, even when poor agents who do not pay taxes
are in majority, the provision of public goods can be less than that chosen by a Rawlsian
planner.
In related work, Hassler, Krusell, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2003) analyze the dynamics
of redistribution in an economy where risk averse agents cannot insure each other because
of market incompleteness. In future research, we plan to study the eﬀect of productivity
shocks on the dynamics of income taxation and the quantitative properties of this model
at business cycle frequencies, as well as the role of government debt.
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8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof of the claim that τO0 = 1 is immediate, given the para-
metric condition. The second part descends from the solution of the following maximization
problem
max
{τY ∈[0,1],τO∈[0,1]}
L¯
¡
τY , τO
¢
=
n
λµ
³
e∗
¡
τY , τO
¢ ¡
1 + β − τY − βτO¢− ¡e∗ ¡τY , τO¢¢2´ +
(β + λ) aµ
¡
1 + β − τY − βτO¢ ¡τY + λτO¢ /2ª .
The solution must satisfy the following FOCs:
∂L¯
∂τY
− ξY + θY = 0
∂L¯
∂τO
− ξO + θO = 0,
where θY , θO are the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier associated with the constraints τY ≥ 0 and
τO ≥ 0, respectively, whereas ξY and ξO are the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier associated with
the constraints τY ≤ 1 and τO ≤ 1, respectively.
Assume, Þrst, that τO = ξY = ξO = θY = 0. Then, one obtains
τY =
(1 + β) (a (β + λ)− λ)
2a (β + λ)− λ ,
θO =
1
2
µa2
(1 + β) (β − λ) (β + λ)2
2a (β + λ)− λ ,
where τY < 1 and θO > 0 as long as β > λ. This establishes part 1.
Assume, next, that τY = ξY = ξO = θO = 0. Then, one obtains
τO =
(1 + β) (a (β + λ)− β)
β (2a (β + λ)− β) ,
θY =
1
2
µa2
(1 + β) (λ− β) (β + λ)2
β (2a (β + λ)− β) ,
where θY > 0 as long as β < λ. Furthermore, it is immediate to verify that τO < 1 as long
as a < β(1−β)(β+λ) (part 2a). If a ≥ β(1−β)(β+λ) , then τO = 1 and ξO > 0. It remains to be
checked, however, whether τY = 0 continues to be a solution. Given τO = 1, we obtain
∂L¯
∂τY
− ξY + θY = 1
2
¡−λµ ¡1− τY ¢+ (β + λ) aµ ¡1− λ− 2τY ¢¢+ θY = 0.
The solution features τY = 0 and θY > 0 if and only if a ≤ λ(1−λ)(β+λ) , which establishes
part 2b. For larger values of a, the solution instead features θY = 0 and
τY =
a (1− λ)− λβ+λ
2a− λβ+λ
,
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as in part 2c. This establishes part 2.
Finally, consider the knife-edge case where β = λ. Then, the objective function can be
written as
L¯(x) = βµ
³
e∗ (x) (1 + β − x)− (e∗ (x))2
´
+ βaµ (1 + β − x)x,
where x ≡ τY + βτO. The FOCs yields the result in part 3.
As to the public good provision, it is straightforward to compute the steady-state public
good provision in each of the cases by substituting in for tax rates from Proposition 1.
PV gR is then computed by discounting the inÞnite sum of these taxes (note that τY start
accumulating in the Þrst period while τO start accumulating in the second period). Given
PV gR, it is straightforward to show that df/da > 0 for a ≥ x since
f 0 (a) = (2a− x)−3 x2 > 0.
This establishes that PV gR is increasing for β ≥ λ and, for β < λ, within each of the three
segments a ∈
h
β
(β+λ) ,
β
(1−β)(β+λ)
i
, a ∈
h
β
(1−β)(β+λ) ,
λ
(1−λ)(β+λ)
i
, and a ∈
h
β
(1−β)(β+λ) ,∞
´
. It
remains to be shown that PV gR is increasing when switching segments. This holds since
lim
a→ β
(1−β)(β+λ)
(
(1 + β)2
1− λ
λ
β
µ
2
· f
µ
a,
β
β + λ
¶)
= lim
a→ λ
(1−λ)(β+λ)
(
µ
2
(1 + λ)2
1− λ · f
µ
a,
β
β + λ
¶)
=
λ
1− λ
µ
2
.
Finally, PV gR ≥ 0 since lima→x f (a, x) = 0.
Proof of Lemma 1. We prove the Lemma by establishing a contradiction. Suppose
that, in the range τY > β − (1− µ) /µ, there exists a τ¯Y such that TO ¡U ¡τ¯Y ¢¢ = 0. This
would imply that U
¡
τ¯Y
¢
=
¡
1− β + τ¯Y ¢ /2 > 1 − 1/(2µ). From equation (12), it then
follows that TO
¡
U
¡
τ¯Y
¢¢
= 1, in contradiction with the presumption. We have therefore
established that, for all τY > β− (1− µ) /µ, it must be that TO ¡U ¡τY ¢¢ = 1. Hence, (13)
implies that U
¡
τY
¢
=
¡
1 + τY
¢
/2, completing the proof of the Lemma.
Proof of Lemma 2. We start by showing that given Uθ ∈ U∗θ , the decisive voter strictly
prefers τY = θ to any τY < θ. To prove this, observe that Zo
¡
τY , 0
¢
= aµτYt
¡
1 + β − τY ¢ /2
is a hump-shaped function of τY , with a maximum at (1 + β) /2 ≥ β. Since θ ≤ β −
(1− µ) /µ < β, it follows that Zo ¡τY , 0¢ is necessarily increasing in τY in the range
τY ∈ [0, θ], and voters never choose τY < θ. Next, suppose θ (β) ≤ β − (1− µ) /µ and
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consider a function Uθ ∈ U∗θ for some θ ≤ β − (1− µ) /µ. Thus, it is optimal to set τYt = θ
if and only if
Zo (θ, 0) = aµθ (1 + β − θ) /2 ≥ aµ/8 = Zo (1/2, 1) = max
τYt ∈[0,1]
Zo
¡
τYt , 1
¢
.
This inequality holds iﬀ θ ≥
³
1 + β −pβ (2 + β)´ /2 = θ (β). From the deÞnition of U∗θ , it
follows that Uθ (θ) = (1− β + θ) /2 ≤ 1− 1/ (2µ). The function TO follows from equation
(12). QED
Proof of Proposition 3. Given τOt+1 = 1, equation (17) implies that it is optimal to
set τYt = 1/2. Moreover, if U ∈ U∗θ with θ < θ (β), it is not optimal to opt for τYt = θ
and induce τOt+1 = 1, since Z
o (θ, 0) < maxτYt ∈[0,1] Z
o
¡
τYt , 1
¢
. It follows that ut+1 = 3/4
for all t ≥ 0, which conÞrms that this is an equilibrium. The uniqueness of the sincere
equilibrium when β < (1− µ) /µ+µ/4 follows from the discussion preceding equation (18).
This completes parts 1 and 2a of the proposition. Part 2b follows from Lemma 2.
Proof of the result in Section 6.2. The political objective function is
W = (1 + ω) a
³
µ (1− ut) τOt +
µ
2
¡
1 + β − τYt − βτOt+1
¢
τYt
´
+µ (1− ut)
¡
1− τOt
¢
+ ωβa
³µ
2
¡
1 + β − τYt − βτOt+1
¢
τOt+1 +
µ
2
¡
1 + β − τYt+1 − βτOt+2
¢
τYt+1
´
+
ωµ
2
µ
1
2
¡
1 + β − τYt
¢2 − βτOt+1µ1 + β − τYt − 12βτOt+1
¶¶
.
The choice of taxes on the old is derived in the main text. For the choice of taxes on
the young, we note that
dW
dτYt
=
1
2
µ
¡
(1 + β) (a+ ω (a− 1))− (2a (1 + ω)− ω) τYt − β (a (1 + ω) + ω (a− 1)) τOt+1
¢
.
Consider Þrst the case when a > 11+ω . Then, τ
O
t+1 = 1 and
dW
dτYt
=
1
2
µ
¡
(1 + β) (a+ ω (a− 1))− (2a (1 + ω)− ω) τYt − β (a (1 + ω) + ω (a− 1))
¢
= 0
→ τYt =
1
2
− ω aβ + 1/2
2a+ ω (2a− 1) ∈
·
0,
5
12
¸
.
For this to be non-negative, we require a ≥ ω1+ω(1−β) (in addition to a > 11+ω ), and we
note that ω1+ω(1−β) is implied by
1
1+ω iﬀ β <
1−ω2
ω , which always holds if ω < −12 + 12
√
5 ≈
0.618.
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Now, when a < 11+ω , we have τ
O
t+1 = 0 and
dW
dτYt
=
1
2
µ
¡
(1 + β) (a+ ω (a− 1))− (2a (1 + ω)− ω) τYt
¢
= 0
→ τYt =
(1 + β) (a+ ω (a− 1))
(2a (1 + ω)− ω) ∈
µ
0,
1
2
¸
.
This increases in a and is non-negative when a ≥ ω1+ω .
Proof of Lemma 3. First, recall that given τOt+1 = 1,
V yl
¡
τYt , τ
O
t+1 = 1, .
¢
= Kyl + Zy
¡
τYt , 1
¢
V y
¡
τYt , τ
O
t+1 = 1, .
¢
= e∗
¡
τYt , 1
¢ ¡
1− τYt
¢− e∗ ¡τYt , 1¢2 +Kyl + Zy ¡τYt , 1¢
V ol
¡
τYt , τ
O
t+1 = 1, .
¢
= Ko + Zy
¡
τYt , 1
¢
,
where Kyl and Ko are independent of τYt . Then, observe that from the deÞnition of Z
y
and Zo, it follows that
Zy
¡
τYt , 1
¢
=
aµ
2
¡
1− τYt
¢ ¡
τYt + β
¢
Zo
¡
τYt , 1
¢
=
aµ
2
¡
1− τYt
¢
τYt .
Standard methods establish that both Zy
¡
τYt , 1
¢
and Zo
¡
τYt , 1
¢
are concave and, hence,
single-peaked with respect to τYt , and that they have unique maxima at τ
Y
t = (1− β) /2
and τYt = 1/2, respectively. The properties of Z
y and Zy carry over to V yl and V o. Finally,
concerning the preferences of the high-ability young, observe that
∂V y
¡
τYt , τ
O
t+1 = 1, .
¢
∂τYt
=
1
2
(aµ (1− β)− 1) +
µ
1
2
− aµ
¶
τYt < 0, (24)
for all τYt ∈ [0, 1]. To see why this derivative is negative, recall that, by assumption, aµ < 1.
Hence, aµ (1− β) < 1. Thus, if aµ > 1/2, the derivative ∂V y ¡τYt , τOt+1 = 1, .¢ /∂τYt is
necessarily negative. If aµ < 1/2, it is suﬃcient to show that the derivative is negative
at τYt = 1. The resulting expression is, in this case, ∂V
y/∂τYt = aµ ((1− β) /2− 1) < 0.
Hence, τyt = 0 is the maximal alternative for the young high-ability agents. QED.
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Figure 1
Ramsey-optimal Tax Rates
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Figure 1: The Þgures represents tax rates, TY and TO, as a function of the planners discount factor
λ in the Ramsey allocations of Proposition 1. The left-hand (right-hand) panel shows the optimal
tax rates when the marginal value of public goods, a, is relatively small (large). In the Þgures, the
private discount factor and the fraction of high-ability agents are held constant at β = 1/2, and
µ = 1.
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Figure 2
Present Value of Public Goods
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Figure 2: The Þgure represents PV gR, the present value of public good provision as a function of
a in the Ramsey allocations of Proposition 1. The planners discount factor is held constant, and
the three graphs represent three diﬀerent values of β, displaying the diﬀerent cases in Proposition
1. The parameter values behind the Þgure are λ = 1/2 and β ∈ {0.1, 0.5, 0.9}.
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Figure 3
Equilibrium Tax Rates under Majority Voting
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Figure 3: The Þgures represent the equilibrium tax functions, TY and TO (ut), under majority
voting. The left-hand (right-hand) panel corresponds to a sincere (strategic) equilibrium of propo-
sition 3. The parameter values behind the Þgures are µ = 2/3 and β = 3/4, and in the right-hand
panel, θ is set to θ = β − (1− µ) /µ = 1/4.
32
Figure 4
Equilibrium Decision Rules under Majority Voting
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Figure 4: The Þgures represent the equilibrium decision rule ut+1 = U
¡
τYt
¢
under majority voting.
The left-hand (right-hand) panel corresponds to a sincere (strategic) equilibrium of proposition 3.
The parameter values behind the Þgures are µ = 2/3 and β = 3/4, and in the right-hand panel, θ
is set to θ = β − (1− µ) /µ = 1/4.
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Figure 5
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Figure 5: The Þgures represent the utility of old agents from taxing the young, Zo, under majority
voting. The left-hand (right-hand) panel corresponds to a sincere (strategic) equilibrium of propo-
sition 3. The parameter values behind the Þgures are µ = 2/3 and β = 3/4, and in the right-hand
panel, θ is set to θ = β − (1− µ) /µ = 1/4.
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Figure 6
Equilibrium Tax Rules under Probabilistic Voting
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Figure 6: The graphs represent values for TY and TO for various values of the marginal value of
the public good, a. The left-hand panel is a case when 1/(1 + ω) > ω/(1 + ω(1 − β)), and the
right-hand panel represents the opposite case. The parameter values are β = 1/2 and ω = 0.4 and
ω = 0.8 for left-hand and right-hand panel, respectively.
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